We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to machines, and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the completion time of the machine it is assigned to. Finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) in this game is simple. However, NE-configurations are not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs. Various measures can be used to evaluate how well an NE-configuration approximates SE.
a b s t r a c t
We consider approximate strong equilibria (SE) in strategic job scheduling games with two uniformly related machines. Jobs are assigned to machines, and each job wishes to minimize its cost, given by the completion time of the machine it is assigned to. Finding a Nash equilibrium (NE) in this game is simple. However, NE-configurations are not stable against coordinated deviations of several jobs. Various measures can be used to evaluate how well an NE-configuration approximates SE.
A schedule is said to be an α-SE if there is no coalitional deviation such that every member of the coalition reduces its cost by a factor greater than α. We show that any pure NE on two related machines of speed ratio s is a -SE, and provide a matching lower bound. In addition, we show that the LPT (Longest Processing Time) algorithm provides a better approximation ratio than a general NE, in particular, any LPT schedule is a 1.1011-SE. This is in contrast to the LS (List Scheduling) greedy algorithm for which the improvement ratio of coalitional deviations can be arbitrarily large. In addition, we design a fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS), which computes an NE that is a (1 + ε)-SE.
We also provide bounds for two other measures of approximate SE, considering the supremum possible improvement of a deviating job and the maximal increase in the cost of non-coalition members, and show that checking whether a specific schedule is an SE is co-NP-complete, which motivates the study of approximate strong equilibria.
Finally, we consider multiple machines. We show that any pure NE on m related machines is a 2-SE. We give improved results for identical machines, and in particular, we show that any pure NE is a 1.32-SE.
Introduction
Job scheduling applications have been greatly studied from a game theoretic perspective in recent years, e.g., [26, 2, 9, 10, 17] . In a game theoretic setting, the jobs are assumed to play strategically in order to minimize their incurred costs, and might deviate to a different machine in order to decrease their costs. This research agenda is motivated to a Fig. 1 . The left configuration is a Nash equilibrium but is not resilient against coordinated deviations, since the jobs of sizes {10, 4} both profit from deviating to the right configuration.
large extent by Internet applications, which are composed of distributed computer networks that are owned, managed and maintained by diverse entities with potentially competing economic interests [31] .
A celebrated notion in game theory is a Nash equilibrium (NE), which is a profile of strategies (one for each player) from which no agent can improve his utility by a unilateral deviation. In such a profile, each agent is best-responding to the strategies played by the other agents. Yet, an NE is not stable against more sophisticated deviations. A stronger solution concept would guarantee stability against coordinated deviations by sets of agents, referred to as ''coalitions''. A profile that is stable against coalitional deviations is called a strong equilibrium (SE) [4] . Specifically, from an SE no coalition can deviate and strictly improve the utility of each one of its members.
The downside of an SE is that such a strong notion of stability rarely exists in games. Yet, several restricted classes of games have been shown to always admit a strong equilibrium [13, 23, 24, 33, 29, 2] , among which is the class of job scheduling games, even under the general unrelated machines setting (where each job can possibly have a different processing time for each machine) [2] . There has also been a considerable amount of work studying the price of anarchy and the price of stability with respect to the SE solution concept in different settings, e.g., [28, 2, 13, 1] .
The vast literature on SE has focused on pure strategies and pure deviations, motivated mainly by the fact that the consideration of mixed deviations often results in strong non-existence results. For example, even in settings with identical machines and identical jobs, if mixed deviations are allowed, then an SE rarely exists.
The key observation that motivates our study is that agents would not necessarily engage in deviations that result in very marginal benefits. Indeed, deviations are many times associated with some transition cost (which can be either economical or mental), and this will lead agents to deviate only if the deviation results in a ''considerable'' improvement. The notion of a ''considerable'' improvement has been formalized and quantified by Albers [1] in network design settings, and later by Feldman and Tamir [16] in job scheduling settings with identical machines. The key observation established in these works is that even in strategy profiles that are not robust to coalitional deviations, the benefit of the deviating coalition members can be bounded. Depending on the setting at hand, coalitional deviations that can only lead to marginal improvements might not take place. Consequently, it is desired to quantify the benefits that can be generated by coalitional deviations in various settings.
In this paper, we expand the study of Feldman and Tamir [16] , who studied the power of coalitional deviations in job scheduling setting of identical machines, to the more general settings of uniformly related machines. Various algorithms have been studied for this setting, carrying different properties with respect to different attributes. While some of these algorithms are extremely desirable from one point of view (e.g., they guarantee a low makespan), they, unfortunately, do not always result in profiles that are SE. Based on the discussion above, it is important to quantify how beneficial coalitional deviations can be from particular profiles that are desirable with respect to other attributes. This is exactly the goal of this paper.
In the uniformly related machines setting, each machine M i (also called machine i) has a speed s i associated with it, and each job j has a size p j > 0. The processing time for job j on machine i is p j /s i . Given an assignment of jobs into machines, the load of a machine is the total size of the jobs assigned to it. The completion time of machine i with load
We let C max denote the makespan, that is the maximum value C i over all machines. The cost of each job is the completion time of the machine it is assigned to. This cost function is commonly used when analyzing systems with negative congestion effect (see [35, 32] and references therein). In particular, systems in which jobs are processed in parallel, or when all jobs on a particular machine have the same single pick-up time, or need to share some resource simultaneously. The jobs in our setting are assumed to be owned by rational agents. i.e., each job wishes to minimize its cost. The setting of uniformly related machines is quite involved, and in this paper we make the first steps in its analysis and focus on the case of two machines. In this case, as speeds and job lengths can be scaled, we can assume without loss of generality that the machines' speeds are 1 and s ≥ 1.
As an example, consider the coalitional deviation depicted in Fig. 1 . In this example, three jobs of sizes {10, 6, 4} are assigned to two uniformly related machines with speeds {1, 2}. In the left configuration, C 1 = 10 and C 2 = 5 (note that in the figure the load is scaled by the speed). It is easy to verify it is an NE. The coalition consists of the jobs of sizes {10, 4} who coordinately decide to swap locations. In the resulting configuration, at the right, C 1 = 4 and C 2 = 8. Both jobs decrease their cost, from 10 to 8 and from 5 to 4. The improvement ratio of both jobs is 5 4 . Note also that the cost of the job of size 6 (that is not a member of the coalition) increases from 5 to 8.
In the above example, the initial configuration is an arbitrary NE schedule. The notion of approximate strong equilibrium can be also explored with respect to schedules that are obtained by various well-known scheduling algorithms, such as LPT (longest processing time) and LS (list scheduling). LS induces some order on the jobs, and assigns each job (according to that order) to a machine that would minimize the completion time of the job. LPT works in a similar manner, but induces a particular order on the jobs, namely, sorts them in a non-increasing order of their sizes. Any schedule that is obtained by LPT is an NE, which is not necessarily the case for the LS algorithm.
With respect to makespan (i.e., maximum completion time of any machine) minimization, LPT provides a constant approximation ratio for any number of uniformly related machines [11, 19, 27] [20, 30] . If the machines are identical, the bounds drop to 4 3 and 7 6 , respectively [22] . LS provides an approximation ratio of O(log m) for m machines [8, 3] , and at most φ = √ 5+1 2
for two machines [8, 14] . For identical machines, the bounds drop to 2 and 3 2 [21] . Finally, it is known [8, 15, 12] that for two unrelated machines, any NE provides a φ-approximation to the makespan.
In this paper we study various aspects of approximate strong equilibrium in settings with two uniformly related machines. In particular, we provide bounds for the three measures introduced in [16] , related to the improvement ratios of the coalition members and the damage ratios of the non-coalition members. Let Γ be a coalition of agents deviating from a schedule q to a schedule q ′ . The improvement ratio of a coalition member j ∈ Γ , is defined as the ratio between its cost in the original schedule q and its cost in the new one q ′ . The minimal improvement ratio of q ′ with respect to q is the minimal improvement ratio of any coalition member. The stability of a schedule q is defined by IR min (q), which is the maximum over all possible deviation outputs q ′ of the minimal improvement ratio of q ′ with respect to q. In other words, there is no coalitional deviation originated from q such that every member of the coalition reduces its cost by a factor greater than IR min (q). The IR min of a scheduling problem is the supremum value of IR min (q) over all valid schedules q. We say that a schedule q is an α-SE if IR min (q) is at most α. This notion has been studied in network design games [1] and job scheduling games with identical machines [16] .
The identical machines setting was extensively studied in [16] . It was shown that for two identical machines, every NE is an SE (i.e., in the special case of two uniformly related machines where s = 1, the value of IR min is 1), but for at least three identical machines, the supremum value of IR min is at least 5 4 , which is tight for three machines. The 5/4 bound was shown to hold for m = 4 (Chen [6] ), and very recently, it was shown to hold for every m ≥ 3 in a working paper by Chen et al. [7] .
For multiple identical machines, it was shown [16] that the value of IR min is at most 2. For an NE schedule computed using LPT, the tight bounds for m = 3, 4 identical machines are ≈ 1.119 respectively [16, 6] , and an upper bound of 4 3 on the IR min is known [16] .
We show that for two related machines with speeds 1 and s, every NE is a (1 + (which is smaller than the bound for NE schedules, and can be at most 1.1011). This bound is almost tight. In stark contrast, for schedules obtained from the LS algorithm, the improvement ratio of coalition members can be arbitrarily large for every s > 1.
While LPT performs relatively well, this is not the best approximation one can hope for. In particular, in Section 5, we design a poly-time algorithm that for every ε > 0 produces a schedule which is a (1 + ε)-SE (and is an NE).
The two additional measures introduced in [16] are IR max and DR max , defined as follows: (i) IR max (q) of a schedule q is the maximum possible improvement ratio among a coalition's members; and (ii) DR max (q) of a schedule q is the maximum possible damage ratio of an agent outside a coalition. IR max and DR max of a scheduling problem are the supremum values of IR max (q) and DR max (q) over all valid schedules q.
For identical machines, it has been showed in [16] that IR max (q) of an NE schedule q can be arbitrarily large, but it is bounded in the interval [ 5 3 , 2] for schedules obtained by LPT. In addition, tight bounds have been provided for the damage ratio measure. In particular, the value of DR max is 2 for NE schedules, while this value decreases to 3 2 for schedules obtained by LPT. Under two related machines we show in this paper that for NE schedules, IR max can be arbitrarily large for every s > 1, and the damage ratio is bounded by . For LS schedules, the damage ratio can be arbitrarily large as well.
In Section 6 we show that the problem of checking whether a given NE is an SE is co-NP-complete for every s > 1 (for any number of machines m ≥ 2). The hardness of computing an SE in a setting of related machines is still open. Clearly, if the problem turns out to be hard, our approximation results do not only explain the stability of various schedules to coalitional deviations, but also has computational implications. In particular, the FPTAS we devise computes a (1 + ε)-SE in polynomial time. This FPTAS combines the known FPTAS of Horowitz and Sahni [25] for the minimum makespan problem with the local jump-operations technique introduced by Schuurman and Vredeveld in [34] .
Finally, in Appendix we consider settings with multiple machines. We extend the upper bound of [16] on the IR min , and show an upper bound of 2 for related machines. In the Appendix, we provide some preliminary results for multiple identical machines. Specifically, the upper bound is improved to 33 25 = 1.32, and a tight bound of 5 4 is established for m = 5 identical machines.
Model and preliminaries

Resilience to coalitions
A game is denoted by a tuple G = ⟨N, (Q j ), (c j )⟩, where N = {1, . . . , n} is the set of players, Q j is the finite action space of player j ∈ N, and c j is the cost function of player j. The joint action space of the players is Q = × n i=1 Q i . For a joint action q = (q 1 , . . . , q n ) ∈ Q , we denote by q −j the actions of players j ′ ̸ = j, i.e., q −j = (q 1 , . . . , q j−1 , q j+1 , . . . , q n ). Similarly, for a set of players Γ we denote by q Γ and q −Γ the actions of players j ∈ Γ and j ̸ ∈ Γ , respectively. The cost function of player j maps a joint action q ∈ Q to a real number, i.e., c j : Q → R.
A joint action q ∈ Q is a pure Nash equilibrium (NE) if no player j ∈ N can benefit from unilaterally deviating from his action to another action, i.e., ∀j ∈ N ∀a ∈ Q j : c j (q −j , a) ≥ c j (q).
A pure joint action of a set of players Γ ⊆ N (also called coalition) specifies an action for each player in the coalition, i.e.,
e., the players in the coalition can deviate in such a way that each player strictly reduces its cost). In this case we say that the deviation to q
is a profitable deviation for the coalition Γ . We assume that all the jobs in the coalition Γ deviate (that is, migrate to another machine). Note however that additional jobs might benefit from the joint action of Γ .
A pure joint action q ∈ Q is resilient to pure deviations of coalitions if there is no coalition Γ ⊆ N that has a profitable deviation from q.
Definition 1.
A pure strong equilibrium (SE) is a pure joint action that is resilient to pure deviations of coalitions.
Clearly, a strong equilibrium is a refinement of the notion of Nash equilibrium. In particular, if q is a strong equilibrium, it is resilient to coalitions of size 1, which coincides with the definition of NE.
Job scheduling on two uniformly related machines
Consider two uniformly related machines, M 1 , M 2 , with speeds s 1 = 1 (slow) and s 2 = s ≥ 1 (fast). There is a set of jobs N = {1, . . . , n}. Each job has a size denoted by p j . The processing time for job j on machine i is p j /s i . A schedule q is an assignment of jobs to machines. Let L 1 (q), L 2 (q) denote the total load (i.e. sum of p j ) of jobs assigned to the slow and the fast machines, respectively, under assignment q. Let C 1 (q), C 2 (q) denote the completion times of the machines. It holds that A coalition Γ is composed of a set of jobs. Given a schedule q, we denote by b 1 and b 2 the total load of jobs from M 1 and M 2 , respectively, that move to the other machine (see Fig. 2 ), and by a 1 and a 2 the total load of jobs on M 1 and M 2 , respectively, that stay on the original machines.
Note that if the original profile, q, is an NE then it must hold that b 1 > 0 and b 2 > 0, since if a coalition has jobs from only one machine, then every job of the coalition would benefit from moving to the second machine even without other jobs, contradicting the fact that q is an NE. Let q ′ denote the post-deviation schedule. We denote the load and the completion time of machine i after the deviation
Stability measures
Let q be a schedule that is not resilient to a coalition Γ . The improvement ratio of a job j ∈ Γ s.t. q j = M i and q
The damage ratio of a job j s.t.
In contrast, the damage ratio of a job j ̸ ∈ Γ might be greater than 1 (e.g., the job of size 6 in the example depicted in Fig. 1 ).
If q j ̸ = q ′ j , we say that job j migrates in the deviation. Note that, in our terminology, a job can be a member of a profitable deviation even if it does not migrate in the deviation (as long as its cost strictly decreases). Yet, every job that migrates in the deviation is a member of the deviating coalition by definition.
Let r 1,2 , r 2,1 denote the improvement ratio of jobs migrating to the fast and slow machine respectively. We have
The following three measures evaluate how well a configuration approximates SE.
Definition 2. Given schedules q and q
Given schedules q and q
Clearly, for any schedule q on two uniformly related machines, and deviation with improvement ratios r 1,2 , r 2,1 as defined in Eq. (1), it holds that IR min (q) = min{r 1,2 , r 2,1 }.
The notion of α-SE [1] is defined in terms of the minimum improvement ratio as follows:
Considered schedules and useful observations
In this paper, we analyze three types of schedules:
• Schedules that are NE.
• Schedules that result from the List Scheduling (LS) algorithm [21] . The LS algorithm is a greedy algorithm that assigns jobs in arbitrary order, each job to a machine that would minimize its completion time, given the current schedule. The schedules produced by LS algorithm are not guaranteed to be NE schedules.
• Schedules that result from the Longest Processing Time (LPT) algorithm [22] . The LPT algorithm is the LS algorithm that assigns the jobs in non-increasing order of their lengths. Schedules that result from (LPT) algorithm are known to be NE schedules [18] .
When we consider profitable deviations from these schedules, we refer to them as NE-originated profitable deviation, LS-originated profitable deviation and LPT-originated profitable deviation, respectively.
Next, we provide several useful observations with respect to NE-originated profitable deviation. The first observation shows that in any NE-originated profitable deviation, if a job migrates to some machine, some other job must migrate out of that machine. This observation holds for any number of machines. Formally:
Observation 4. Let q be an NE and let q
This is valid since if job j strictly decreases its cost by migrating to a machine that no other job leaves, it can also profitably migrates unilaterally, contradicting q being an NE.
The next observation limits the NE-schedules in which a coalition might exist to those in which the makespan is determined by the slow machine.
Observation 5. If a schedule q is an NE but not an SE, then the completion time of the slow machine is larger than the completion time of the fast machine; that is L
Proof. Given that q is not an SE, let Γ be any coalition. Let r = min{r 1,2 , r 2,1 }. Since q is an NE, there must be at least one job migrating from each machine to the other one (otherwise, a job can migrate alone, contradicting the fact that q is an NE).
Therefore, both r 1,2 and r 2,1 are greater than 1, and consequently r > 1. We have L
3. Approximate strong equilibrium by Nash equilibria Proof. We start with the lower bound for s > 1. Consider the following three jobs j 1 , j 2 , j 3 of the sizes
+ s, where the first job is assigned to the first machine, and the other jobs to the second machine. Note that for s = 2, this is the instance described in Fig. 1 . In this schedule, 
To prove an upper bound, consider a schedule q which is an NE, but not an SE. Let Γ be a coalition. Let r = min{r 1,2 , r 2,1 } be the minimum improvement ratio.
By Observation 5 (which can be used since q is an NE but not an SE), C 1 > C 2 . Replace the jobs assigned to M 2 in q by very small jobs (''sand''), and call the new scheduleq. This is still an NE, since jobs still do not benefit from moving unilaterally from the second machine to the first machine, which has a larger completion time, even without any additional jobs. Clearly, any coalition is still valid. We modify the coalition without changing the value of r. Specifically, the new coalition consists of all jobs that were in the coalition previously, all jobs of the first machine, and an additional total of size a 1 of the small jobs on M 2 that were not in the coalition previously (this is possible since
We get s Next we show that the supremum improvement ratio is unbounded and provide a tight upper bound for the damage ratio. Proof. Let q be an NE schedule that is not an SE. We first show that jobs on M 1 cannot be damaged at all. Formally, C
This is valid since C ′ 1 < C 2 , as some jobs improve by migrating to M 1 , and since, by Observation 5, C 2 < C 1 . Hence, we only need to consider the damage caused to jobs on M 2 that are outside the coalition. Since q is a Nash equilibrium, it is not beneficial for a single job to migrate from M 1 to M 2 . Therefore, it is clearly not beneficial for all the jobs on M 1 to migrate together to M 2 . Thus, we can bound the completion time of the slow machine, M 1 , by
The maximum damage ratio can be bounded by analyzing the case in which all jobs from M 1 migrate to M 2 . By the above, it is bounded by
Next, we show that the above analysis is tight and in addition, that for any given r, there is a set of jobs and a schedulẽ q for which IR max (q) ≥ r; i.e., the value IR max of a schedule can be arbitrarily large. Consider a schedule of three jobs.
. Assume that the first job is assigned to M 1 , and the other jobs to M 2 . This schedule is an NE. Consider the coalition consisting of the first and the second jobs. The damage ratio of the third job is ).
Note that IR max is unbounded independently of s, while the damage ratio can be arbitrarily large by letting s tend to 1.
The performance of LPT and LS algorithms
Longest Processing Time (LPT)
In this section we consider a subclass of NE, produced by the Longest Processing Time (LPT) rule [22] . The LPT rule sorts the jobs in a non-increasing order of their sizes and greedily assigns each job to the machine on which it will be completed first. As shown in [18] , every configuration produced by LPT in the related machines model is an NE. In what follows we scale the job sizes so that L 1 + L 2 = 1. Let γ be the size of the last job assigned to the slow machine during the LPT process.
The following lemma holds for any LPT schedule.
Proof. Let λ 1 and λ 2 denote the machine loads at the time of assignment of the last job of the slow machine. By the LPT rule,
The assertion of the lemma follows.
In the remainder of the section we will be interested in schedules created by LPT that are not SE schedules. We prove an auxiliary lemma regarding such schedules.
Lemma 9. Let q be a schedule produced by LPT on two uniformly related machines, that is not an SE. The slow machine must be assigned at least two jobs, and L
Proof. Given that q is not an SE, let Γ be any coalition. Let r = min{r 1,2 , r 2,1 }. Assume towards contradiction that only a single job, j 1 of size b 1 is assigned by LPT to M 1 . By Observation 4 we have that L 1 , where the first inequality follows from Eq. (1) and the middle strict inequality follows from Observation 5. By LPT, this implies that only jobs arriving after j 1 might migrate from M 2 . Let A be the total size of jobs that arrive before j 1 . LPT assigns j 1 to M 1 , therefore, As the slow machine has at least two jobs, and the size of the last (and smallest) such job is γ , we have
. Theorem 10. Let q be a schedule produced by LPT on two uniformly related machines. Then, IR min (q)
Combining with the bound on L 1 from Lemma 9 we get the following bound on IR min (q):
We note that the above function has a maximum at s = 1 + √ Next, we consider the IR max and the damage ratio. We show that unlike the general case, these two measures are both bounded for outputs of LPT. We start with an additional property of such schedules.
Lemma 11. Let q be a schedule produced by LPT on two uniformly related machines, that is not an SE. Then the set of jobs migrating
from the fast machine must contain at least one job assigned earlier than the last job assigned to the slow machine; that is, a job size at least γ .
Proof.
We show that at least one job of the coalition is assigned to the fast machine before the last job is assigned to the slow machine. Assume by contradiction that this is not the case. Let λ i denote the load on machine i before the assignment of the last job on the slow machine. Thus, λ 2 ≤ a 2 . Since the migration is beneficial,
Since γ is the size of the smallest job assigned to the slow machine, we have b 1 ≥ γ .
By the assignment rule of LPT, Proof. We first note that jobs migrating from the slow machine benefit from the migration and thus a 2 + b 1 < s(a 1 + b 1 ) .
We have IR max (q)
.
. Using
by Lemma 9, As noted in the proof of Theorem 7, the only jobs that may have a damage ratio above 1 are those remaining assigned to the fast machine. We have DR max (q) ≤ 
Summing the two inequalities gives (2s
Next, we show that the overall upper bounds of 2 on the IR max and the damage ratio cannot be improved. The reason for the relatively high values is that the algorithm scans the input in an online fashion (after sorting it), and given the difference in speed, the machines do not become sufficiently balanced. If a job joins a coalition even if it can improve its cost very slightly, the alternative schedule can be very different from the original one. We construct an example for s > 3 that exhibits the situation obtained in the upper bound proof for the IR max . The slow machine has two jobs roughly of the same size (slightly below s). The fast machine has completion time approximately 2s − 1, and among other jobs, it has a job of size slightly larger than s. This last job will benefit from moving to the slow machine if its jobs move to the fast machine. The two jobs of the slow machine will indeed benefit from moving if the parameters are chosen appropriately (as their completion times on both machines will be approximately 2s). Let s ′ = ⌊s⌋, and ρ = s − s ′ (0 ≤ ρ < 1). We use two parameters: a large value M such that M > 3s + 1 and a small value ε > 0 such that ε < 
). Finally, the last job is assigned to the slow machine since , and consider the four jobs of sizes 1 + 2τ + τ 2 , 1, 1, and 2τ − τ 2 . The first job is assigned to the fast machine and the second one is assigned to the slow machine. We have 2 < 1+2τ +τ 2 +1 1+τ , so the third job is assigned to the slow machine as well. The fourth job is assigned to the fast machine since 1+4τ 1+τ , which tends to 2 as τ tends to zero.
List Scheduling
List Scheduling (LS) is a greedy scheduling algorithm, where, similarly to LPT, each job is assigned to the machine on which it will complete earliest [21] . However, unlike LPT, the jobs are assigned in an arbitrary order. Two prominent advantages of the LS algorithm are its suitability to online settings and its scarce memory requirements. Both LS and LPT provide a constant approximation to the optimal makespan on two uniformly related machines [8, 14] , but they carry different game theoretic properties. First, LS does not necessarily produce an NE. Moreover, as we next show, LS does not provide any approximation to an SE. The following theorems show that already for very small instances (consisting of two or three jobs), both the IR min and the DR max are not bounded (with the exception of the DR max being bounded in the case s = 1, that is, for identical machines). The intuitive reason for these properties is that small jobs may be scheduled before large jobs, and (if there are multiple such jobs) they can be either split almost equally between the machines, or they are often assigned to the fast machine. After a huge job arrives, it is much better for a small job which is combined with the huge job by LS to be scheduled on the other machine. In all examples below, this is the status after LS schedules all jobs, and as a result, a relatively small job performs a migration. Thus, the bounds are in fact valid even for coalitions of size 1-when the schedule produced by LS is not even an NE. 
Next, assume s = 1. For the lower bound, consider an instance consisting of three jobs p 1 = 1, p 2 = 1, p 3 = 2. The first two jobs are assigned to different machines by LS. Assume without loss of generality that the third job is assigned together with the first job. This schedule is not an NE. By migrating, j 1 reduces its cost from 3 to 2. Moreover, the cost of j 2 is increased by a factor of 2. To prove the upper bound, consider a schedule created by LS. We show that any coalition only contains jobs migrating from the more loaded machine to the other. Assume otherwise, and let L 1 , L 2 , and L ′ 1 , L ′ 2 denote the loads (which are equal to the completion times) of the two machines before and after the migration, respectively. Then we have L
Thus, the coalition contains jobs migrating from the more loaded machine, M 1 , to the less loaded machine, M 2 .
Let j ℓ be the last job assigned to M 1 . We show that j ℓ is not part of the coalition. Let T 1 , T 2 be the loads of M 1 , M 2 before j ℓ is assigned. Then T 1 ≤ T 2 . The cost of j ℓ is T 1 + p ℓ and if it moves its cost will be at least T 2 + p ℓ (maybe more, if it moves with additional jobs, or if M 2 is assigned additional jobs after j ℓ is assigned). Therefore, the migrating jobs have total size at most T 1 . These jobs join jobs of size L 2 ≥ T 2 . Since T 1 ≤ T 2 ≤ L 2 , the load of M 2 is increased due to the coalition move by factor at most 2.
Computing a (1 + ε)-SE
We describe an FPTAS for the problem, i.e., given any ε > 0, the algorithm produces a schedule q so that IR min (q) ≤ (1+ε), in time polynomial in the number of jobs and in 1/ε. In addition to approximating the IR min , the FPTAS simultaneously approximates the makespan within a factor of 1 + ε.
The FPTAS consists of the following two steps.
1. Apply an FPTAS for the minimum makespan problem; e.g., of Horowitz and Sahni [25] (see also [5] ). 2. Turn the resulting schedule into a Nash equilibrium, using local jump-operations, as described by Schuurman and Vredeveld [34] .
As defined in [34] , a jump operation is performed by a single job migrating from one machine to another. A schedule is jump-optimal if no jump decreases the makespan. It is easy to verify that a schedule is jump optimal if and only if it is an NE. Given a schedule, it is possible to perform in polynomial time a sequence of jump operations resulting in a jump optimal schedule, having a makespan not larger than the original schedule [34] . Let q be the output of the above process. Clearly, q has makespan at most (1 + ε)C max (opt) and is an NE, therefore, the algorithm is an FPTAS.
Claim 15. The output q of the above FPTAS is a (1 + ε)-SE.
Proof. Let C i (q) denote the completion times of the machines. By the above, q is an NE, therefore, any coalition has jobs from both machines. Let q ′ denote the schedule produced by a coalitional deviation. The minimal improvement ratio of a job in the coalition is min{
}. As q ′ is a feasible schedule, we know that max{C 1 (q ′ ), C 2 (q ′ )} ≥ C max (opt) and as both C 1 (q), C 2 (q) ≤ (1 + ε)C max (opt), we get min{
} ≤ (1 + ε), as required.
Computational complexity
The following theorem shows that for two uniformly related machines the problem of checking whether a given NE is a strong NE is co-NP-complete. This result should be contrasted with two identical machines, where every NE is also an SE, thus verifying whether a given profile is an SE can be done in linear time.
Theorem 16. For any s > 1, the problem of checking whether a given NE is an SE is co-NP-complete.
Proof. We use a reduction from partition. Consider an instance of partition, that is, let {z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z t } be a set of positive integers, such that
We assume K ≥ s + 1 ≥ 2, which can be obtained by multiplying all integers by 2⌈s⌉ + 2.
Note that α > 2, β = αs + s − 2, and µ > δ.
We consider jobs of following sizes.
We claim that the schedule in which the last two jobs scheduled to the slower machine, and the other jobs to the faster machine, is an NE. The completion time of the faster machine in this schedule is
The completion time of the slower machine is
Thus, we only need to verify that none of the last two jobs obtains a smaller cost by moving to the faster machine, that is C 2 + p t+2 s
− s, which clearly holds for K ≥ 2.
Next, we consider a possible coalition. We first note that p t+1 would never join a coalition, since even if it would be assigned alone on the slower machine, its completion time would be at least βK ≥ C 2 , since β > . We show that this is at least C 1 . We need to show
Substituting the values of α, µ and δ we get,
Next, we consider a structure of a possible coalition. By Observation 4, a coalition must contain at least one job from each machine, therefore, p t+3 must switch places with some subset of the first t jobs. Let X denote the sum of these jobs. Thus we have p t+2 + X < C 2 and
Note that X must be an integer, since it is the sum of a subset of the first t jobs. Therefore, the only value of X that admits a coalition is K . Thus, the schedule is not a strong NE if and only if a partition exists.
Appendix. Multiple machines
In this section we consider a more general setting, where there are m parallel machines. Let F (m) denote the value of IR min for m identical machines, and let G(m) denote the value of IR min for m related machines. We will consider schedules that are arbitrary NE. We say that a machine participates in a coalition if at least one job leaves this machine or at least one job migrates to this machine. Let f (m) denote the value of IR min for deviations in which the number of participating machines is exactly m. By definition, we have F (m) = max m ℓ=1 f (ℓ). We next characterize minimal coalitions. A coalition, for which the value of IR min is β, is minimal if every coalition consisting of a smaller number of jobs has at least one job that improves by a factor smaller than β.
Claim 18. Every machine participating in a minimal coalition has at least one job that leaves it and at least one job that migrates to it. For identical machines, every machine participating in the coalition has at least two jobs assigned to it.
Proof. By Observation 4, a machine that has a job joining it must have a job leaving it. Consider a machine that only has a job leaving it. By removing this job from the coalition, we get a smaller coalition with at least the same improvement ratio. This contradicts minimality.
Consider identical machines, and assume by contradiction that some machine has a single job. This job must migrate, but it already has the smallest possible cost, so moving to a different machine cannot reduce its cost, which is a contradiction. Consider the subset of machines M ′ which participate in the coalition. Consider machine j in M ′ , let X j be the size of a coalition job migrating to j (that must exist) and let i be a machine from which it migrates. Since the schedule is an NE, the completion times of the machines before the migration satisfy:
. However, since after the migration this job has a cost that is smaller by a factor of at least r, we get
. This (combined with the very first inequality) gives
Taking the sum over all machines in
The first equality holds as other machines do not participate in the coalition and therefore the total size of jobs assigned to machines participating in the coalition remains unchanged. Thus, r − 1 ≤ 1, which implies r ≤ 2.
Note that the value r = 2 cannot be achieved. In such a case, we have L 
, where the first inequality holds since a job migrates from j to i, and the second one is due to r = 2. Using
, where the equality holds by the assumption L ′ j = L j , and the inequality holds by the choice of j as a machine of maximum completion time before the deviation, participating in the coalition. This gives a contradiction. Still, the IR min is a supremum value and thus we cannot claim that IR min < 2 based on this observation.
A.1. Identical machines
Since in the case of identical machines the load and the completion time of a machine in a given schedule are equal, we use both terms interchangeably. In what follows, we always scale the instance and assume that the minimum completion time of any machine is 1. Since machines that do not participate in the coalition have no effect on the value of the IR min for a given coalition, we always assume that all machines participate in the coalition (other machines are ignored, but by Claim 17 the result is valid also for the original number of machines). As before, throughout this section we assume a minimal coalition. Using Claim 18, we can assume that if the machines are identical, then each machine has at least two jobs assigned to it.
Claim 20. Consider a machine i in an NE schedule that contains t ≥ 2 jobs. Then its completion time satisfies
Proof. Let π i denote the size of a minimum sized job assigned to i. We have C i ≥ t · π i , which implies π i ≤
C i t
. Since the schedule is an NE, moving this job to the least loaded machine is not beneficial, so we have 1 + π i ≥ C i . Combining the two bounds we get
. Using the fact that t ≥ 2 completes the proof.
We consider a schedule q, and a coalition. We use K = C 1 ≥ C 2 ≥ · · · ≥ C m = 1 to denote the completion times before the deviation of the coalition (without loss of generality we assume that the machines are sorted by completion time), and let κ 1 ≥ κ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ κ m denote the sequence of loads after the deviation (here κ i is not necessarily the load of machine i in the original ordering of machines). That is, if the machines are sorted again by non-increasing loads after the deviation, then κ i is the load of the ith machine. Let r = IR min (q). In what follows, if a schedule is discussed without mentioning which schedule this is, then the schedule before the deviation is considered. We start with simple upper bounds on the loads on the most loaded machine and the least loaded machine after the deviation. Proof. Consider a machine whose resulting load after the migration is κ 1 . This machine receives at least one migrating job coming from some machine j. Its new load is therefore at most . Thus, the smallest load after the migration cannot exceed
We let n i denote the number of jobs leaving machine i in the coalition. Let ν i =  i j=1 n j and ν 0 = 0. The motivation for this definition is that it is either the case that many jobs leave the most loaded machines, in which case their loads were not very large, or if only a few jobs are leaving, then machines that do not receive jobs coming from these machines will receive jobs coming from less loaded machines, and thus they must have very small resulting loads. For example, as shown in the previous claim, machines that in the process of deviation receive new jobs coming only from machine 1 could potentially have loads up to
. However, there are at most n 1 such machines. All other machines of the schedule after the deviation will have loads that do not exceed
, as every machine must receive a new job in the process of deviation. This can be generalized as follows.
Proof. Consider the ν i + 1 ≤ m most loaded machines after the deviation. At least one of them does not have a job that migrated from machines 1, . . . , i (since only ν i jobs migrated from the i most loaded machines). Consider such a machine i ′ . Since at least one job migrated to i ′ , but no job migrated from machines 1, . . . , i, then it has a job that migrated from a machine in {i + 1, . . . , m}, that is, from a machine that had a load of at most C i+1 . The new load of i ′ is at most
, and thus the minimum load among the 1, . . . , ν i + 1 most loaded machines is at most
Consider a simple example where m = 7, n 1 = 2, n 2 = 3, and n 3 = 3. In this case we already know by Claim 21 that after the deviation no load exceeds
, and in particular, each of the two largest loads after the deviation is at most . Additionally, each further load is at most
, as at most five machines can receive jobs coming from machines 1 and 2. Since we already have an upper bound on the minimum load after the deviation, κ 7 , we use this last upper bound only for κ 6 , even though n 3 = 3. Therefore, the first machine i for which ν i ≥ m − 1 has a special role, and we define it as follows. Let k denote an index such that ν k ≥ m − 1 and ν k−1 < m − 1. Note that k must exist since each machine has a migrating job, so n i ≥ 1, ν i ≥ i, and ν m−1 ≥ m − 1. Thus,
In what follows the intuition is that the worst case scenario is that the migrating jobs were distributed exactly in this way; n 1 jobs (coming from machine 1) to the machines of resulting loads κ 1 , . . . , κ n 1 , n 2 jobs (coming from machine 2) to machines κ n 1 +1 , . . . , κ n 1 +n 2 and so on (until the first m − 1 machines of the schedule resulting by the deviation are listed), while the least loaded machine after the deviation received a job coming from machine m (since this job must migrate to some machine).
We next find a bound on
Using  m j=1 C j =  m j=1 κ j (each being equal to the total size of all jobs) we get
, since the number of jobs it contains before the deviation is at least n i . If n i > 2, then
. Let A denote the set of machines i that have the following two properties: C i > 5 3 and n i = 2. Since every machine that contains at least three jobs in q has a load of at most 3 2 , if i ∈ A, then it has exactly two jobs before the deviation, and both these jobs migrate. There could be, however, other machines of loads above 5 3 , that obviously have exactly two jobs (before the deviation), but only one migrating job. Proof. We first show that two jobs coming from the machines of A cannot migrate to the same machine. Clearly, a pair of jobs coming from the same machine of A migrate to different machines, otherwise they do not benefit from migrating.
Consider two jobs of sizes π 1 and π 2 coming from different machines of A, and let ℓ 1 > If there is a job coming from a machine i ∈ A that migrates to another machine j ∈ A, then swap the contents of machines i and j after the migration. Since all jobs that were assigned to machines in A belong to the coalition, that is, during the migration process these machines are completely emptied, this is just a matter of renaming the machines, and the swap does not add new jobs to the coalition. As a result, machine i does not belong to A anymore, as at least one its jobs does not migrate and we remove it from the coalition. Since at least one job is removed from the coalition (a job that now stays on machine i), while the coalition remains non-empty (as it originally consisted of at least two jobs). The value of IR min cannot decrease and the new coalition has a smaller number of jobs, which contradicts the minimality of the coalition.
Thus, all jobs of A migrate to machines that are not in A, each to a different machine, so we have m − |A| ≥ 2|A|. This proves the claim.
Next, we show a simple property. Therefore, in what follows we consider only the cases 1 ≤ k ≤ m − 2. Based on the above claims, we bound the value of F (m). We give an alternative proof to the results of [16, 6] Proof. Clearly, f (1) = 1. The case m = 2 is covered by Claim 26, since the only possible value of k is 1.
For the case m = 3, the only remaining possible value of k is k = 1. In this case n 1 ≥ 2. We get r ≤ , using C 3 ≥ C 4 . This expression attains its maximum for a maximal value of C 1 and a minimal value of C 2 . Using C 1 ≤ 2 and C 2 ≥ 1 we get r ≤ 6 5 .
For m = 5 we need to consider k = 1, 2, 3. Assume by contradiction r > 1. 25 
Thus we have F (5) ≤ 1.25. Consider the case m ≥ 6, and assume r > 1.25. Consider the prefix of machines 1, 2, . . . , h that have loads above 5 3 .
Clearly, the set of these machines contains A (and maybe some other machines). Each such machine satisfies n i ≤ 2, and in fact has at most two jobs before the deviation, since otherwise C i ≤ 3 2 . Thus, any machine i in this prefix that is not in A has n i = 1, while each machine i ∈ A has n i = 1.
Let n Assume first that k ≤ h, and recall that k < m. We bound holds for m ≥ 3. Since
The ratio 
For every 1 ≤ i ≤ |A|, the maximum ratio is achieved if C i is maximal, so we use C i ≤ 2, and replace  |A| i=1 C i in the expression that we are bounding with 2|A|. For every |A| + 1 ≤ i ≤ h, the maximum value is achieved if C i is minimal, and we use the simple bound C i ≥ 1, and replace  h |A|+1 C i in the expression with h − |A|. 
